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.Abstract
ALLISON E. ROVNY: New Social Risks, Social Policies, and Dualization in the
Contemporary Welfare State.
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens)
In recent years, much attention has been given in the welfare state literature to the pres-
ence of new social risks in postindustrial political economies and the growing divide between
those deemed to be insiders and outsiders. In fact, the term “new social risks” arguably
signifies one of the defining areas of contemporary research on welfare state adaptations in
advanced a✏uent democracies. In this dissertation, I examine how the various “worlds”
of welfare provision—specifically, social policy tools—a↵ect the well-being of new social risk
groups, and whether we are indeed witnessing an emergence of labor market and welfare state
outsiders. I investigate the determinants of outsiderness expressed as single parent income,
child poverty rate, and youth unemployment. I analyze the e↵ects of social policies on the
likelihood of being poor among low-skilled populations. I find that social policies such as
active and passive labor market policies, family policies, and government daycare spending
are e↵ective at combating new social risks. Employment protection legislation may impede
low-skilled young people from escaping poverty. Lastly, this dissertation considers the case of
Germany and probes the extent to which a divide between labor market insiders and outsiders
has cemented there over time, whether the welfare state (via taxes and transfers) exacerbates
or ameliorates this dualism, and indeed, whether labor market dualization—an individual-
level phenomenon—translates into dualization of the welfare state—a phenomenon that is
necessarily measured at the household level.
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1 Introduction
With the change of social and labor market policies in the 21st century to emphasize ac-
tivation of citizens into the labor force, the welfare state has become a prominent venue
for analysis of the di↵erential capacity of di↵erent groups to fit into the “employment as
social protection” scheme, and of di↵erent welfare state regimes to encompass the evolv-
ing structure of social risks. Women have become an important focus of contemporary
welfare state studies, as this demographic group was previously underrepresented in
the labor market, as were young adults. The nexus between state, market, and family
has become a defining feature of social policy analysis. However, we know that not
everyone has equal access and attachment to employment, and di↵erent welfare state
regimes face varying levels of increasing social stratification. This is particularly true of
unskilled segments of the population, who face greater obstacles to secure employment
in todays “knowledge-intensive services” economy. In my dissertation, I examine those
groups who are considered to be on the periphery of the labor market—those with
unstable and weak employment links—and the capacity of the welfare state to shelter
them from social disadvantage.
In the first chapter, I analyze indicators of “outsiderness” using three dependent
variables that have been established in the literature as representing particularly vul-
nerable groups: 1) youth; 2) single parents; and 3) children in poverty, both over-
all and in single-mother families. I examine the e↵ects of important welfare state
features—active labor market policies (ALMP), passive labor market policies (PLMP),
employment protection legislation (EPL), family policies and daycare, sick-pay and
unemployment benefit generosity, and union density—on these outsider groups. This
chapter conducts macro-level, pooled time-series analyses across 16 OECD countries
over time, from 1990-2004.
The second chapter uses a combination of micro- and macro-level data and thus
employs multi-level statistical regression analyses. I analyze the e↵ects of social policies
on the likelihood of being in poverty for three “new social risk” groups: young low-
skilled women and men, and older low-skilled men. I use Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS) micro-data and macro-level policy data centered around the year 2004.
The third chapter focuses on the case of Germany and proposes answers to the
following questions: 1) Whether there are more labor market outsiders in Germany
today than there were 20 years ago; 2) Whether these outsiders are indeed worse o↵
today than two decades ago; and 3) Whether the welfare state (via taxes & transfers)
increases or lessens this dualism. I find that the answers vary depending on the op-
erationalization of labor market insiders and outsiders, and that overall, the German
welfare state is e↵ective in narrowing the gap between insider and outsider income
levels. Indeed, I show that labor market dualization does not necessarily translate to
welfare state dualization, and I consider the critical di↵erences between measurement
of these concepts at the individual and household levels.
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2 Emerging Outsiders in Contemporary Welfare States
2.1 Introduction
Continental Bismarckian Welfare States have undergone gradual yet cumulatively pow-
erful transitions in social and labor market policy. In the 1970s to 80s, the dominant
strategy in these countries was to combat high rates of unemployment with labor-
shedding strategies—that is, policy incentives were designed to push older and less
productive workers out of the labor market in order to “free up” jobs for others. How-
ever, the main policy tool in use today reflects an entirely di↵erent aim: maximum
labor force participation of all those of working age. It is now generally agreed that the
former labor-shedding strategy constitutes a policy failure that, rather than create jobs,
led in fact to a stifling job environment: the gross non-wage labor costs grew as a result
of more people out of the labor market needing social assistance, so that employment
became more expensive and, perversely at the same time, the pool of public financial
resources shrank, since the number of people paying into the system decreased.
In European countries today, the strategy of labor shedding and forced early retire-
ment is looked upon as a relic of poor choice: the new goal has shifted to raising the
labor market activity rate of the working age population. The focus now is on activa-
tion of the labor force: the retirement age has been pushed back, and older workers are
encouraged to remain productive members of society contributing to the labor force—
and thus paying into the system—as long as they can. Furthermore, requirements for
receiving means-tested assistance have been sharpened: job-seekers must prove that
they are actively seeking employment in order to receive unemployment assistance. A
key change of interest is the emphasis on a long-neglected labor force potential: women.
Womens roles have shifted from the traditional stay-at-home wife/mother in a male-
breadwinner family to active participants in their own right within the labor market.
While mothers were once encouraged in the Bismarckian welfare countries to withdraw
from the labor force upon the birth of a child—and thus they received steady payments
over the course of three years, for example—policy-makers have now shifted to a dif-
ferent tactic. Governments now encourage women to reenter the job market through
various tax incentives, subsidized benefits like childcare, part-time employment options,
and shorter maternal benefits/leave schemes that are more strongly linked to previous
employment and prior job market position. With the Lisbon Strategy of 2000, womens
employment levels became an EU target for improvement: the goal was that by 2010,
these rates should be at or near 60%, a rate that most European countries have now
attained.
Youth represent a final category of the population that lags in activation levels:
among the unemployed in Europe, youth and women are over-represented, especially
in the southern European countries where labor and housing markets are tight, thus
encouraging young people to live longer with their parents–and thereby exacerbating
a characteristically Bismarckian welfare state problem: low fertility and population
aging.
Therefore, we can expect that continental European welfare states will witness
an increasing degree of social stratification: those with weaker ties to employment—
employment being the emphasized primary source of welfare provision, rather than the
large social state—may fall through the cracks of this new mode of “activation as em-
powerment.” Furthermore, the negative consequences of work-conditioned welfare will
be experienced most strongly by those on the periphery of the labor market: youth,
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single-parent families (especially single mothers), and by the children of those families,
as witnessed by growing child poverty. In this paper, I analyze indicators of “outsider-
ness” using three dependent variables: 1) child poverty rate, both overall and within
single mother families, measured at 50% of median income; 2) single parent median
net income as a ratio to household median net income; and 3) youth unemployment
rate. I examine the e↵ects on outsiderness of welfare state features such as employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL); active and passive labor market policies (ALMP
and PLMP, respectively); family policy allowances and daycare; sick-pay and unem-
ployment benefit generosity; and union density. I conduct pooled time-series analyses
across sixteen OECD countries from 1990-2004: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.1
The di↵erential capacity of di↵erent social policy regimes to adequately address
these new social risks forms todays core social policy research agenda. While the
existence of a new social risk profile has been discussed in the literature, there is a vast
gap in what we know so far about the impact of policy on di↵erent societal groups,
across di↵erent welfare regime clusters. The question remains of how to successfully
incorporate disadvantaged groups into the workforce: this is where social and labor-
market policy can come into play, and where systematic comparative research has yet to
be conducted. The core research question concerns the roles of labor-market and family
policies: whether they deepen inequality and add to the dualization of the welfare state,
resulting in further divides between insiders and outsiders, or whether they alleviate
the social risk profiles of those on the labor market periphery.
1Due to data availability, the sample size varies according to the dependent variable used. For child
poverty (both overall and in single-mother families, the number of countries is sixteen. For the single
parent income ratio using Eurostat data, the number of countries, twelve, is limited to EU countries.
For youth unemployment, data are not available for Australia, and thus the number of countries in
the sample is fifteen.
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2.2 The new inequalities
Continental Europe and the countries of principal interest to my investigation are show-
ing signs of consolidating a dualization between insiders and outsiders–between those
in the core, stable, labor force, and those in the outside, peripheral, fringe of unstable
jobs and temporary contracts (Palier and Thelen 2010). This dualization contains a
gender component. Growth of atypical work has opened opportunities for women to
enter the labor market; however, these “mini-jobs” (temporary jobs, not covered by
social benefits) do not yield stable employment attachment for women, who fill the
majority of these jobs (Esping-Andersen 2009). In essence, the expansion of the low-
wage sector has increased womens opportunities for paid work, but it remains unclear
whether this employment constitutes “good” jobs that reduce womens dependence on
a male breadwinner. Youth and women make up a large percentage of these outsiders,
characterized by unemployment and precarious, short-term, jobs. This lower social
position of young adults and single women has a distinct corollary: child poverty has
increased dramatically to above the OECD average (12.4%) in Germany (16.3%) and
Italy (15.5%) (Chapple and Richardson 2009). Here the divide between insiders and
outsiders is acutely observable, in terms of sheer numbers of youth unemployed (espe-
cially in southern Europe) and protracted duration of such unemployment, presence of
temporary jobs, and the high levels of employment protection legislation (EPL), which
privileges the core workforce often at the expense of those working in unstable jobs who
do not easily penetrate the core labor market (Esping-Andersen 1999).
In other research (Rovny 2011), I found that EPL is a strong predictor of fertility
but with a negative relationship. This finding, along with the positive correlation
between family policies and fertility, is echoed in Nelson and Stephens’ findings on the
e↵ects of EPL and family policies on womens employment (2008). In addition, active
labor market policies (ALMP) are found to be positively correlated with both fertility
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and womens employment. Thus we expect a similar relationship between EPL, family
policies, ALMP and the outcomes of these outsider groups: single mothers, youth, and
indirectly, child poverty. Moreover, while the concept of dualization has been suggested
as institutionalized in welfare state reforms over the past decade within the realms of
unemployment insurance and pensions (Palier and Thelen 2010), there has been no
systematic research on dualization within family-oriented social policies.
The impact of the changing demographic conditions can be seen when examining
the family. With the rise in single parenthood, we have seen a rise in the Gini coe cient
in the U.S. The share of children in single-mother households ranges from a low of 5%
in Southern Europe to 15-20% in the Nordic countries and North America (LIS key
figures: http://www.lisproject.org/
key-figures/key-figures.htm). Strikingly, the Nordic countries have largely avoided the
consequence of children falling into poverty within single-parent households, especially
when viewed in comparison with the Continental and Liberal welfare states. Welfare
policies may make a crucial di↵erence in this realm. Furthermore, as Table 2.1 and
Figure 2.1 below show, when examining the prevalence of child poverty by household
structure, we see that children of lone parents, and particularly of lone mothers, have
a vastly increased likelihood of living below the poverty threshold than do children in
two-parent households. However, this phenomenon is most severe in only two of the
welfare state clusters: Anglophone, or Liberal, welfare states, and in the Continental
European, or Bismarckian, welfare states. Thus we see that child poverty is greater in
these two welfare state “worlds,” due to low women’s employment levels (Continental
countries) and insu cient social provisions including income support and childcare
infrastructure, especially for lone mothers, who comprise a critical outsider group in
terms of labor market status.
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Table 2.1: Child Poverty Rate by Household Structure and Welfare Regime
Lone-mother Lone-father Two-parent
Anglophone 43.3 29.2 11.5
Continental European 33.0 12.0 5.3
Nordic European 9.6 5.9 2.1
Source: Gornick, J. C. and Jntti, M. 2009, in Kamerman et al. 2009.
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Figure 2.1: Child Poverty Rate by Household Structure and Welfare Regime
Source: Luxembourg Income Study data. Generated with Stata 11.1.
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2.3 Variables hypothesized to a↵ect outsiderness
Descriptions of the variables and their hypothesized e↵ects on the three outsider groups
are shown in Table 2.2.
2.3.1 Decreased employment regulation: EPL
Greater flexibilization of the labor market in the Bismarckian countries has meant in-
creasing numbers of short-term contracts, agency work, atypical employment, and the
creation of low-paying “mini-jobs” (Eichhorst 2007, Palier and Thelen 2009). The rela-
tionship of atypical employment to the degree of outsiderness is two-pronged. Atypical
employment entails more precariousness for outsiders such as low-skilled, older workers,
youth, and women. However, flexible employment (classified as “atypical,” including
part-time employment) also has the potential to enable women, in particular, to remain
within the labor market while caring for children. And while the existence of temporary
work constitutes a “work-around” to the problem of strict hiring and firing rules (which
encourage labor market exclusivity), those who possess such employment remain at risk
of long-term low wages, poverty, and long-term unemployment (Eichhorst 2007).
In other words, atypical employment is in fact becoming typical: part-time and
temporary contracts have been growing by 15-20% annually across the EU since the
1980s, and in continental Europe, atypical employment for women is the norm rather
than the exception (Husermann and Schwander 2009). This outsider status based on
atypical work is particularly obvious in continental Europe, where social insurance is
based on the employment biography of the male industrial worker (Van Kersbergen
1995).
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is a passive income/job-protection policy
tool that is generally seen as benefiting a core group of insiders, who maintain a solid
connection to the labor market, at the expense of those on the exterior of the core labor
10
market who would otherwise like to penetrate the market and become stably employed
(Esping-Andersen 1999, Rueda 2007). In countries with strict job protection laws and
various restrictions on temporary and part-time work, a dual labor market emerges in
which “outsiders” (those without stable employment) face di culty in obtaining the
secure positions enjoyed by “insiders.” The high-EPL model of privileging the core
workforce yields this insider/outsider divide: the high wages and job security enjoyed
by chiefly male insiders is predicated in e↵ect on the exclusion of youth and women.
It is generally agreed that stricter employment protection laws inhibit employment
among youth and outsiders who are left out of protected labor schemes, and propagate
the insider/outsider divide (Rueda, 2005). Therefore, I hypothesize that the stronger
the employment protection levels in a country, the greater the degree of outsiderness:
higher disparity between single parents’ earnings relative to the population average;
higher youth unemployment; and higher child poverty rate given the more exclusive
nature of the labor market, compared to those countries with lower EPL.
The measure of EPL used in this paper is a composite OECD indicator that cap-
tures the rigidity of hiring and firing rules. Taken as a composite measure, EPL is
expected to be associated with greater youth unemployment, since youth constitute
a quintessential “outsider” category made of those who are without permanent, sta-
ble, labor market attachment. EPL is expected to exacerbate child poverty and single
parent income disparity, due to the social exclusion mechanism of outsiders from the
labor market. However, these findings will vary according to welfare state typology:
the Nordic countries have social benefit schemes, along with strong active labor market
policies, that are su cient to prevent socio-economic exclusion of the outsiders, while
these countries exhibit moderate levels of EPL.
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2.3.2 ALMP
Active Labor Market Policies are one facet of social policy that plays a direct role in
employment levels. ALMP can be seen as having an impact on the “insider-outsider”
roles in employment. Outsiders, including those who are disadvantaged in the labor
market such as the unemployed, atypical workers, and excluded people (single mothers,
immigrants, low-skilled, disabled) who have di culty securing and maintaining jobs,
benefit from the training, re-entry, and skills-acquisition emphasis of ALMP (Rueda
2007). We can expect that ALMP have a positive e↵ect in lessening the degree of
“outsiderness”—that is, the higher the ALMP value (measured as government spending
on ALMP as percentage of GDP, divided by the unemployed population), the lower
the value on the outsider dependent variables: child poverty rate, single parent median
income ratio to overall income, and youth unemployment rate.
2.3.3 PLMP
Labor market strategies that fall under the rubric of passive labor market policies pro-
vide income protection for those who are temporarily without market income, rather
than directly promoting employability (Martin and Grubb 2001). Passive programs
such as unemployment insurance and income support assist the unemployed by supply-
ing some income stability in the event of loss of employment income. However, because
these policies are passive in nature and do not actively retrain or reintegrate workers
into the workforce, their outcome is mixed: they do not aim to enhance the employa-
bility of labor market outsiders, such as single parents and youth, but they assist those
who are temporarily out of employment. Thus, passive labor market policies can be
seen as a tool to aid “insiders,” or those who already have labor market attachment. I
hypothesize that passive labor market policies will be negatively related to single parent
income and positively correlated with youth unemployment and child poverty.
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2.3.4 Family policy generosity and childcare a↵ordability/availability
When examining the e↵ects of policy and household caregiving responsibilities, three
di↵erent patterns along the familialization/de-familialization continuum emerge (Sara-
ceno 2010). Saraceno identifies “familialism by default” as characterized by a lack
of publicly provided alternatives to family care and financial support. “Supported
familialism” occurs when policies, usually through financial transfers, provide sup-
port to families in maintaining their caring and financial responsibilities. Thirdly,
“de-familialization” characterizes policy that reduces family responsibilities and de-
pendency. Defamilialization occurs through both state (publicly financed transfers
and/or services) or market provisions (market-provided services or private social insur-
ance). However, as Saraceno points out, these two branches of defamilialization do not
share the same conceptual footing: recourse to market provisions is largely dependent
on family resources, leading to families being a highly socially di↵erentiated actor as
consumers of market services. Therefore, a key point emerges: social and economic
inequalities become highly relevant when defamilialization measures are to be secured
through the market, as opposed to the state.
In other words, the higher the presence of familialism by default, the greater the
chance that gender and social class di↵erences will impact family care-givers. Gender
and class thus interact in a stronger way when caring for the family is not taken up by
state provisions, but is rather left to the familys own resources. Women with a weaker
position in the labor market, due to lower skills and/or time spent out of the labor
market due to childbearing and -rearing, are at a distinct disadvantage from both men
and from women with higher skills, who have a stronger attachment to the solid, core,
insider, labor market than do women with low skills. Furthermore, low-income families
have less recourse to market-provided services because they cannot a↵ord them, and/or
they use the money they receive as child payments rather to pay for household expenses,
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and stay out of the labor market, thus making an implicit tradeo↵ between employment
and caring. Therefore, higher government expenditures on both family allowances and
daycare should yield a decrease in child poverty (overall and in single-mother families).
These should also yield a higher ratio of single parent income to overall income, since
single parents should be more able to work outside the home when there is daycare
available, and family allowances should boost income, albeit perhaps only marginally.
2.3.5 Union density
The level of union density, defined as union membership as a proportion of wage and
salary earners in employment, is included as a control variable. This variable o↵ers
another way of capturing potential insider-outsider dynamics, related to levels of wage
inequality. There are generally lower levels of inequality among union members than
among nonmembers of unions (Oliver 2008, Wallerstein 1999). Unions tend to favor
wage scales that prevent firms from paying wages below a certain level, thus potentially
a↵ecting those at the bottom of the income spectrum (youth and single parents). The
lower the union density, the smaller the proportion of the population that is protected
by wage bargaining, and the more economically vulnerable are low-skilled workers.2
In other words, where unions are strong, wage dispersion is lower, thereby a↵ecting
poverty levels.
Welfare Generosity
To control for spurious e↵ects of my main indicators, I include as a political control
variable the Scruggs (2004) welfare state entitlements generosity index, comprised here
of unemployment generosity and sick pay generosity measures. This index captures the
2In the regression models, I also used the variables “union bargaining coverage” and “wage disper-
sion” separately, in order to test other possible measures of the insider-outsider divide. These were,
however, insignificant.
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overall intensity of welfare generosity and allows for testing of the e↵ects on outsiderness
of the main policy variables identified above. I also include the unemployment rate as
a control variable.
2.4 Measurement of data and sources
Table 2.3 presents the mean values of the dependent and independent variables by
country. Data on employment protection legislation (EPL) are from the OECD (Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development) annual time series. The sum-
mary index summarizes a number of sub-indices measuring the di culty of layo↵ (terms
of notice, severance pay, etc.) and regulations restricting the use of temporary work
(Bradley and Stephens 2007). This EPL index is measured on a 6-point scale, with
0 being the least restrictive and 6 being the most restrictive (Venn 2009). The index
summarizes three main areas: 1) employment protection of regular workers against in-
dividual dismissal; 2) specific requirements for collective dismissals; and 3) regulation
of temporary forms of employment.
The Active Labor Market Policy (ALMP) and Passive Labor Market Policy (PLMP)
variables are operationalized as public expenditure on active and passive labor market
measures, respectively, as a percentage of GDP, divided by the unemployed population.
Both the EPL and ALMP/PLMP variables are standard OECD measures that are
widely used in welfare state studies.
Data on daycare is defined as “Public expenditure on day care/home-help services
as a % of GDP,” and comes from the OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX).3
Data on family allowances are defined as, “Total expenditures on family allowances
as a percentage of the countries gross domestic product,” and come from the OECD,
3www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure.
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as provided by Gauthier (2010).4 Union density, defined as union membership as a
proportion of wage and salary earners in employment, comes from Huber et al. Com-
parative Welfare States dataset version 2010, using Jelle Visser’s union membership
dataset (Visser 1997, updated).
The data on unemployment and sick pay welfare generosity come from Scruggs’
Welfare State Entitlements summary data set (2004). The unemployment generosity
data is calculated as the ratio of the net unemployment insurance benefit to net income
for an unmarried single person earning the average production worker (APW) wage.
The sick pay measure is the ratio of the net insurance benefit for general short-term
illness (not workplace or occupational illness or injury) to net income for a single person
earning the APW wage.
Data for the four dependent variables come from various sources. Data on child
poverty come from the Luxembourg Income Study Key Figures and cover di↵erent
years for di↵erent countries. However, most countries in the sample have data points
on child poverty beginning in the 1990s through approximately 2004. I use two di↵erent
dependent variables measuring “child poverty”: the relative child poverty rate measured
at 50% of the median income, and the child poverty rate in a single-mother family, also
measured at 50% of the median income.
Data for the third dependent variable, the ratio of single-parent median equivalized
net income to median household income, come from Eurostat-SILC (Statistics on In-
come and Living Conditions).5 The fourth dependent variable, youth unemployment,
comes from the World Bank World Development Indicators database. The measure is
4OECD StatExtracts. Social and Welfare Statistics Social Protection Social Expenditure Aggre-
gated data. (On-line: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx; accessed March 2010).
5http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes;
accessed November 5, 2010.
16
the percentage of the total labor force aged 15-24 that is unemployed.6
2.5 Data Analysis
I employ random e↵ects pooled time-series regression estimation for all models and
analyze indicators of “outsiderness,” measured variously by 1) child poverty rate; 2)
single-parent median equivalized net income as a ratio to overall net household income;
and 3) youth unemployment. I conduct my analyses using Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS) data from multiple waves; Comparative Welfare States dataset (Huber et al. 1997,
updated 2004 and 2010); Gauthier Comparative Family Policy Database (2010); and
OECD, Eurostat, and World Bank data across 16 OECD countries.7 The countries
include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the
United States and the time period covered is 1990-2004.
Beck and Katz (1996) and others have argued for the inclusion of country dummies
in order to deal with omitted variable bias. Plmper et al. (2005: 3304) in their recent
treatment of this issue have countered that inclusion of country dummies does much
more than eliminate omitted variable bias. It also: (1) eliminates any variation in the
dependent variable that is due to time invariant factors such as di↵erence in constitu-
tional structures; (2) greatly reduces the coe cients of factors that vary mainly between
countries; (3) eliminates any di↵erences in the dependent variable due to di↵erences at
time t in the time series; and (4) completely absorb(s) di↵erences in the level of the in-
dependent variables across the units (1996). Elaborating on this last point, they argue
that if one hypothesizes that the level of the independent variable has an e↵ect on the
6http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; accessed November 18, 2010.
7Countries and years in the sample are limited by data availability. See footnote 1.
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level of the dependent variables (for example, the level of unemployment on the level
of child poverty), a fixed e↵ects specification is not the appropriate model. If a theory
predicts level e↵ects, one should not include unit dummies. In these cases, allowing
for a mild bias resulting from omitted variables is less harmful than running a fixed
e↵ects specification (1996: 334). I hypothesize e↵ects in the levels of the independent
variables on the level of the dependent variables at time t. In addition, variation in
several of the independent variables, including the critical policy variables, is primarily
cross-sectional. Thus, it is clear that fixed e↵ects estimation or the inclusion of country
dummies is not appropriate in this case (cf. Huo et al. 2008).
2.6 Results
The results of the models are presented in Table 2.4. The models produce both expected
and unexpected results. While EPL is significant in two of the models, its sign in one
of the models of child poverty is the opposite of that expected. EPL would be expected
to capture the insider-outsider divide that pits the economic well-being of the core
insiders with stable employment against that of the outsiders, who have precarious
employment; thus we would expect that EPL is correlated with an increase in child
poverty, based on adequate family resources that prevent poverty coming from the
earners in the family. This expectation is indeed borne out in the model of single parent
income. EPL’s indication of outsiderness is captured when looking at its e↵ect on single
parent median income in relation to the population’s household median income: a two-
standard deviation increase in EPL results in a 13.4% decrease in the single parent
income ratio.
As hypothesized, family allowances are a strong predictor of decreasing child poverty,
with these e↵ects being most dramatic in a single-mother family. For a two-standard
deviation increase in family allowance spending, the child poverty rate within single
mother families decreases by 9.5 and 11.4 percentage points in the two models, but by
only 1.3 percentage points for overall child poverty. This is a strong indication that
combating child poverty within single-mother homes is strongly advanced by family
allowances.
Similarly, government daycare spending is a strongly significant predictor of child
poverty (in a negative direction), as well as of single parent income (positive direction).
Moving two standard deviations on the daycare spending measure yields a 5% decrease
in child poverty of single mothers, and a 2% decrease in overall child poverty. Moreover,
a two-standard deviation increase in daycare spending results in an 8.4% increase in the
single parent income ratio. Family allowance expenditure shows a comparably strong
negative e↵ect on child poverty, particularly in a single-mother family. Taken together,
government spending on daycare services and family allowances provides a significant
mechanism for ameliorating child poverty, both overall and in single-mother households,
in addition to bolstering single parent income.
Union density has significant e↵ects on the dependent variables, but presents some
interesting implications. While greater union density is associated with lower child
poverty (a two-standard deviation change in union density yields a decrease in overall
child poverty of 4.5 percentage points), it is associated with an 11-13% increase in youth
unemployment. Since union density captures the extent to which insiders are unionized
within a country, this finding may reflect that youth are unable to penetrate the core
group of union insiders, and thus higher union density is associated with an increase
in youth unemployment. However, this would also suggest that since child poverty
decreases with increased union density, parents are either able to be covered in union
representation and thus maintain their jobs and income attachment, or that there are
other mechanisms at play that are associated with higher union density—such as within
Nordic, family-friendly, welfare regimes—that lead to lower child poverty outcomes.
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Notably, union density has no significant impact on the child poverty rate within single
mother families, which may suggest that single mothers are not adequately represented
by unions or that their income levels are not a↵ected by higher union membership.
The e↵ects of welfare state generosity as measured by unemployment benefits and
sick pay correspond to expectation: they are correlated with a decrease in single-mother
child poverty and youth unemployment, and an increase in single parent income. Child
poverty is decreased by up to 6.2%, and youth unemployment by 7.4%.
Government expenditure on passive labor market policies is also a significant pre-
dictor of the dependent variables. Similar to union density, the results suggest multiple
interpretations. While passive labor market policies are aimed mainly at providing in-
come maintenance to those without work—i.e. unemployment insurance—these mea-
sures will be targeted at those who are temporarily separated from employment. Unlike
active labor market policies, passive labor market policy measures are not aimed at in-
tegration or activation of members outside the core workforce, but rather supporting
those who have already secured a job position. Given this logic, it follows that passive
labor policy measures would not diminish child poverty in families on the periphery
of the labor market. Indeed, an increase in passive labor market policy measures is
associated with an increase in child poverty and a decrease in single parent income.
Using the two-standard deviation measure, an increase in PLMP yields an 8.2% in-
crease in child poverty of single mothers and a 1.4% increase in overall child poverty.
Similarly, the increase in PLMP yields a 10.7% decrease in the single parent income
ratio. Strikingly, government expenditure on active labor market policies reduces youth
unemployment by 4.9 percentage points, making an important case for the e↵ectiveness
of these policies in integrating this underrepresented segment of the population into the
labor force. Contrary to hypothesized e↵ects, active labor market policies do not show
a significant impact on child poverty levels or single parent income.
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2.7 Conclusion
In the political economies of Europe today, measures of “old risk” prevention such
as unemployment insurance and sick pay exist alongside “new risk” profiles, most of
which center around the persistence of inequalities not just between the sexes, but
within them. As Esping-Andersen (2009) describes, the womens revolution of the
1970s has come to a stalling point: while the income gap between men and women
has decreased, gaps between womens groups have increased. There are three broad
challenges in the 21st century that threaten social equality: 1) How to adapt institu-
tions to the new role of women–as breadwinners in their own right; 2) How to prepare
youth for the knowledge economy, in which skills are highly rewarded; and 3) How to
respond to the new demography of low fertility and an ever-increasing elderly popula-
tion (Esping-Andersen 2009). As women have entered the workforce in higher numbers
than in preceding decades, institutions embedded in social policies and those analyzed
in this paper–childcare, family allowances, active and passive labor market policies, em-
ployment protection rigidity, union density–may need to be adapted to accommodate
womens presence in the labor force and mens and womens roles in raising children.
Families arguably lie at the heart of the contemporary social risk profile, forming the
locus where the three pillars of a welfare regime—family, state, and market—intertwine.
The capacity to adequately cope with these risks will be unevenly distributed among
citizens based on levels of education, income, and policy formulation. The new risk
target group, or group most a↵ected by the structure of new social risks, does not pos-
sess a su cient attachment to the labor market to deal with the financial imposition
that these risks imply. New risks have mainly to do with entering the labor market
and establishing an enduring position in it, and with care duties that arise principally
at the early stage of family-formation. In addition, many scholars have recently drawn
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attention to the later risks posed to families of providing long-term care for frail, de-
pendent, elderly (Saraceno 2010, Knijn and Ostner 2002). Individuals who are able
to successfully navigate the transition to solid, paid employment, as well as those who
develop strategies of care-taking using independent means, are much less likely to expe-
rience the urgency or the strain of these new social risks. Thus we see how polarization
comes into the picture: new social risks pose a problem mainly to certain subsets of the
population: these include youth and single parents, who often do not have available
recourse to the family or the market for provision of family care services (for children
and/or the elderly).
What we see from this paper’s analyses is that labor market policies can and do
a↵ect outcomes of those in a disadvantaged position, namely single parents, children
in poverty, and youth. While family policies (daycare and family allowances) decrease
child poverty, unemployment benefits and sick pay generosity are also associated with
lower child poverty and increased single parent income relative to median income.
While active labor market policies do not from these analyses show significant e↵ects
on child poverty and single parent income, we know from previous research that active
labor market policies are positively related to employment levels (Huo et al. 2008,
Nelson and Stephens 2008). Indeed, this association is borne out in the e↵ect of active
labor market policies on youth unemployment, which is markedly decreased by these
policies. In this paper’s analyses, passive labor market policies were the stronger (i.e.
significant in more models) of the two labor market policy indicators, indicating an
outsider-reinforcing mechanism. This is evidenced by an increase in child poverty and
a decrease in relative single parent income. Surprisingly, passive labor market policies
do not appear from these analyses to aggravate youth unemployment, but rather they
are associated with a decrease in youth unemployment. Union density, on the other
hand, had the opposite e↵ect on youth unemployment: rather than decreasing it, it is
22
associated with an increase in unemployment levels of this segment of the population.
This finding lends support to the notion of unions as protectors of insiders who have
established connections to jobs. Youth appear to belong to the outsider group who are
not as able to penetrate the labor market. Further research will need to parse out the
potential causal complications in this story, and how the employment opportunities for
youth diverge from those of an older population. Furthermore, policies that promote
the inclusion of single parents into the labor market will continue to be of utmost
importance, as the welfare of their children arguably depends on it.
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3 The Capacity of Social Policies to Combat New Social Risks
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, much has been made in the welfare state literature of the presence of
new social risks in postindustrial political economies (Esping-Andersen 1999, Hemerijck
2002, Taylor-Gooby 2004, Armingeon and Bonoli 2006). In fact, the term “new social
risks” arguably signifies one of the defining areas of contemporary research on welfare
state adaptations in advanced a✏uent democracies. The welfare state has long been
the subject of study for its mechanisms of combating social risk and decommodify-
ing the typical male industrial worker (Esping-Andersen 1990, Korpi 1980). However,
in the context of postindustrialization and an evolving global economy, scholars and
policymakers alike have turned to analyzing how the modern economy can avoid new
social risks in times of technological change and globalization, with states still providing
a modicum of social wellbeing for their citizens, especially those deemed to be most
vulnerable. A range of policy tools remains in e↵ect under postindustrialism, having
originated in divergent models of welfare provision that today are commonly known as
“worlds of welfare capitalism” (Esping-Andersen 1990). How these various worlds of
welfare provision—specifically, policy tools—interact with the well-being of new social
risk groups forms the basis of this paper.
In this paper, I consider the groups who are most likely to be victims of these new
social risks, and test the implications of social policies for their well-being. Specifically,
I conduct multi-level regression analyses to analyze the e↵ects of social policies on the
likelihood of being poor of low-skilled young women and men aged 18-30, and of those
at risk of possessing obsolete skills, namely low-educated men aged 55-64. I conduct the
analyses by combining both macro-level policy data and household- and person-level
micro-data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) cross-national database. This
paper provides a contribution to the literature on social policy, new social risks, and
the contemporary welfare state of advanced industrialized economies, in one of the first
multi-level analyses to specifically focus on welfare policies and vulnerable population
groups. My central question is to ask which policies—active labor market policies
(ALMP), passive labor market policies (PLMP), employment protection legislation
(EPL), family policies, and government daycare spending—are e↵ective at combating
new social risks. In addition to analyzing social policies, I also include union density
and representation of women in national parliaments in my models as two measures that
depict agents who are most intent on combating old and new social risks, respectively.
Because the time point at which I analyze the e↵ects of social policies on individual-
level poverty is centered around the year 2004, my analyses capture the new social risk
structures that have arisen in the new welfare state of the early 2000s—i.e. the “Third
Way” of the social welfare state that promotes activation rather than passive welfare
uptake (Huo et al. 2008).
New social risks tend to be concentrated within specific groups: youth, women,
families with small children, and older workers with obsolete skills. Given the nature of
these societal groups, there is di culty in identifying one underlying cause or uniting
interest. As Kitschelt and Rehm (2006) state, there is “diversity, if not conflict” among
the new social risk groups, contingent upon age and gender, due to a lack of unifying
interest. In this paper, I focus on social risk groups as defined by low skill level: 1)
young, low-educated males, aged 18-30; 2) young, low-educated females, aged 18-30; 3)
older, low-educated men, aged 55-64.
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Young people with low skill levels are exposed to a high risk of unemployment
while having dwindling earning power. Young low-skilled females may have as a fur-
ther constraint the concern of raising young children and/or caring for elderly parents.
Older low-skilled males have the added risk of preparing for imminent retirement. Fur-
thermore, they risk having antiquated skills that do not match the updated skill-level
requirement of the current labor market.1
Before I discuss specific social policies and their hypothesized e↵ects on individual
measures of well-being, I turn to a discussion of new social risks and how to conceptu-
alize them.
The vulnerabilities characterizing new social risks stem from three distinct features
of the postindustrial economy. First, while gender appeared as an overlooked yet vital
component of the welfare state research schema of the 1990s (Orlo↵ 1993, Sainsbury
1996, Daly 1994), it has now become fully inserted into the understanding of social
risks and how these relate to the political economy. Changing gender roles are one of
the primary aspects of contemporary social risk profiles: women have entered the labor
force in higher percentages than ever before, and their educational attainment matches,
or in some countries exceeds, that of men. Countless academic and mainstream-media
reports discuss the implications of women’s increased entry into the labor market, in-
cluding the heightened need for childcare outside the home and the ways in which these
gender shifts are spawning social and domestic shifts (Vos 2009). With evolving gen-
der roles and changing family structures, we have seen a rise in lone-parent, especially
single-mother, households, which risk being poor due to the particular challenges for
them of combining work and parenthood (Taylor-Gooby 2004, Esping-Andersen 2009).
As women have made massive advances in education and employment levels, thereby
1I do not include older women as a new-risk group, under the logic that they have traditionally been
sheltered against social risks via their status as spouses, and have typically had less active life-cycle
employment profiles than their male counterparts (with the exception of the Nordic countries).
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achieving more equal opportunities with men, the balance of unpaid labor of care re-
sponsibilities within the home has shifted: the postwar gendered division of home labor
imposes strains on the family in todays modern era.
Second, changes within the labor market include the de-standardization of employ-
ment and the weakening labor market position of the low-skilled. In todays post-
industrial societies, economic growth rates are lower and less certain, and states face
various measures of economic austerity. Technological advancements have altered the
landscape of the industrial manufacturing sector, resulting in lower mass employment
in this sector, as well as increased economic unpredictability for the semi- and low-
skilled. Economic globalization and the inherent competition that accompanies it have
produced greater flexibility within the labor market, albeit to varying degrees.
Lastly, changes have occurred within the welfare state itself. As activation has be-
come the buzzword especially in the employment-lagging continental European coun-
tries, the welfare state is being rebuilt around work, as with the Hartz IV reforms in
Germany and similar measures in France. Thus, the new phase of continental Euro-
pean welfare politics can be described as the e↵ort to make all citizens fit into the labor
market as the new means to social inclusion, this particularly for women, who were
previously discouraged from work and from the employment-based model of social in-
clusion. The state is now seen as an activating state, and not merely a passive, socially
supportive, state. German political discourse, for example, has centered on the need
for an aktivierender Staat (“activating state”) (Wollmann 2003). With this new mode
of welfare provision, however, must come certain changes. Citizenship alone does not
guarantee entitlement to welfare benefits, but rather, benefits are conditioned upon
work status. Those who enjoy a strong attachment to the labor force, and thus can
reap substantial benefits based upon labor market performance (in addition to private-
pillar benefit schemes), will be much better equipped to handle lifes risks. Those with
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weaker skills and labor force attachment will find their welfare contingent upon other
provisions and a necessity to resort to a) private or b) familial mechanisms of support.
Conservative welfare states face the challenge of adopting social policies that address
the new needs of the population, while maintaining fiscal responsibility during stringent
financial times. At the same time as these new needs have arisen, new social risks have
presented themselves as obstacles to social parity and societal well-being (Taylor-Gooby
2004).
Let us now turn to a definition of new social risks, based on the synthesis of several
streams of recent scholarly work. As aptly summarized by Bonoli (2006), new social
risks are seen as the insecure situations under which individuals experience welfare
losses and which result from the socio-economic transformations of the past three to
four decades, generally subsumed under the heading of “postindustrialization.” Dein-
dustrialization, the boom of employment in the tertiary sector (service sector), and
the significant entry of women into the labor market, have increased the instability
of family structures and at the same time, increased the destandardization of employ-
ment. More jobs now are classified as “atypical” jobs, which include part-time work,
temporary contracts, and low-wage or “mini-jobs,” which do not carry social benefits.
We can thus classify new social risks into distinct categories. Reconciling work and
family life entails ensuring the viability of a dual-earner family model, as opposed to
the classic and outdated (as the sole possibility) “male breadwinner” model, in which
only the male works. Having two earners in the family greatly reduces the odds of the
family falling below the poverty line (Esping-Andersen 2002). As a corollary, single
parenthood entails a heightened risk of poverty, especially when the parent is not in
stable employment. As with the need for childcare, having a frail elderly relative can
now be seen as a social risk, as this care duty must also be externalized. These relatives
were once cared for informally by non-working women, but with the large-scale entry
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of women into the labor force has come a depletion of the supply of abundant, free,
care.
Possessing low or obsolete skills signifies a significant new social risk. During the
postwar years, the low skilled found economic salvation in the manufacturing sector,
where wages could grow because of advances in technology–and therefore, increases in
productivity–and as a result of strongly mobilized unions’ bargaining (Bonoli 2006).
Conversely, today low-skilled people are either unemployed or are employed in the low-
value added service sector, which entails retail, cleaning, catering, etc., and is known for
providing little opportunity for productivity increases (Pierson 1998, Iversen and Wren
1998). In the contemporary economy, having low or obsolete skills poses a major risk of
welfare loss, since the sheltered manufacturing sector which had provided an economic
safe haven now does so considerably less (Bonoli 2006). Finally, new social risks are
exemplified by insu cient pension coverage that results as the cost of increasingly
atypical career patterns. Part-time, unstable work and employment interruption due
to childcare carry a risk of inadequate pension coverage, and therefore a risk of loss of
welfare. The following section presents hypotheses regarding social policies and their
e↵ects on the poverty level of the low skilled.
3.2 Hypotheses
The hypothesized e↵ects of the macro-level independent variables on the dependent
variables—poverty of the low-skilled by age and gender—are summarized in Table 3.1.
In this study, the micro-level variables are entered only as control variables.
[Table 3.1 about here]
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3.2.1 ALMP
Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) are one facet of social policy that plays a direct
role in employment levels. ALMP can be seen as having an impact on the “insider-
outsider” roles in employment. Outsiders, including those who are disadvantaged in the
labor market, such as the unemployed, atypical workers, and excluded people (single
mothers, immigrants, low-skilled) who have di culty securing and maintaining jobs,
benefit from the training, re-entry, and skills-acquisition emphasis of ALMP (Rueda
2007). We can expect that ALMP have a positive e↵ect in lessening poverty of the
new social risk groups–that is, the higher the ALMP value (measured as government
spending on active labor market policies as a % of GDP, divided by the unemployed
population), the lower the odds of poverty.
3.2.2 PLMP
Labor market strategies that fall under the rubric of passive labor market policies
(PLMP) provide income protection for those who are temporarily without market in-
come, rather than directly promoting employability (Martin and Grubb 2001). Passive
programs such as unemployment insurance and income support assist the unemployed
by supplying some income stability in the face of loss of income. However, because these
policies are passive in nature, and do not actively retrain or reintegrate workers into
the workforce, their outcome is mixed: they do not aim to enhance the employability
of labor market outsiders, such as single parents and youth, but they assist those who
are temporarily out of employment. Thus, passive labor market policies can be seen as
a tool to aid “insiders,” or those who already have labor market attachment. It would
be di cult to parse out the e↵ects of PLMP on di↵erent segments of the population. In
most cases, greater government spending on PLMP will be expected to be associated
with less poverty. PLMP is operationalized (like ALMP) as government spending on
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passive labor market policies as a % of GDP, divided by the unemployed population.
3.2.3 EPL
Employment protection legislation (EPL) is a passive income/job-protection policy
tool that is generally seen as benefiting a core group of insiders, who maintain a solid
connection to the labor market, at the expense of those on the exterior of the core labor
market who would otherwise like to penetrate the market and become stably employed
(Esping-Andersen 1999, Rueda 2007). In countries with strict job protection laws and
various restrictions on temporary and part-time work, a dual labor market emerges in
which “outsiders” (those without stable employment) face di culty in obtaining the
secure positions enjoyed by “insiders.” The high-EPL model of privileging the core
workforce yields this insider/outsider divide: the high wages and job security enjoyed
by chiefly male insiders is predicated in e↵ect on the exclusion of youth and women. It
is generally agreed that stricter employment protection laws inhibit employment among
youth and outsiders who are left out of protected labor schemes, and propagate the
insider/outsider divide (Rueda 2005). Therefore, I hypothesize that the stronger the
employment protection levels in a country, the greater the degree of outsiderness, and
therefore the higher poverty. One caveat here would concern the Nordic countries,
where the e↵ect of EPL on poverty will be smaller than the reducing e↵ect on poverty
of these countries’ generous active labor market policies and family policies. In other
words, the outsider-barrier nature of EPL in the Nordic countries will be felt much
less acutely, if at all, due to the strong emphasis there on labor market activation and
integration that is lacking in many continental European countries.
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3.2.4 Family policy generosity and childcare availability
As women and men on the lower end of the income spectrum face greater obstacles to
keeping their families out of poverty, it is of particular importance that the earners in
the family (whether single-parent or dual-parent) have access to childcare options in or-
der to maintain a basic income through employment, and that benefits are structured
in such a way as to promote gainful employment and not promote undue exit from
employment. Exit from employment hinders parents prospects of later return to the
workforce, as well as carries an income penalty of lost wages or wages that remain stag-
nant. Family policy can either exacerbate or diminish the inegalitarian consequences of
modern female roles, as a report by Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt outlines (2008, 2010).
When the female revolution does not entail enhanced labor force participation by the
lower income groups, greater social inequalities—at the very least, in income level—will
ensue. If the bottom-end of the income spectrum could fully participate in new female
roles, we would expect far less polarizing social consequences. I expect family policy
generosity and higher government spending on daycare both to reduce poverty.
3.2.5 Union density
The level of union density, defined as union membership as a proportion of wage and
salary earners in employment, is included as a measure of agency of old social risk
protection. This variable o↵ers another way of capturing insider-outsider dynamics,
related to levels of wage inequality. There are generally lower levels of inequality among
union members than among nonmembers of unions (Oliver 2008, Wallerstein 1999).
Unions tend to favor wage scales that prevent firms from paying wages below a certain
level, thus potentially a↵ecting those at the bottom of the income spectrum (youth
and single parents). The lower the union density, the smaller the proportion of the
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population that is protected by wage bargaining, and the more economically vulnerable
are low-skilled workers.2 In other words, where unions are strong, wage dispersion is
lower, thereby a↵ecting poverty levels. However, unions can be viewed as agents who
have traditionally protected those who are prone to the old social risks of unemployment
in the large manufacturing sectors, disability, sickness, etc., while younger low-skilled
women and men would be outside such union coverage. Thus, I hypothesize that higher
union density will be associated with lowering the poverty of older low-skilled men, but
not of youth, who occupy more non-unionized and atypical jobs.
3.2.6 Percentage of seats of women in parliament
The proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments is used as a proxy for
women’s mobilization. This measure of gender equality represents agency of those who
combat new social risks associated with women’s modern roles in the workplace. The
higher the percentage of seats held by women in national legislatures, the higher the
expected overall degree of gender parity, both in terms of inputs (policies) and outputs
(women’s labor force participation, education levels, etc.). Thus, I expect higher levels
of women’s representation in government to be associated with lower levels of poverty
among low-skilled women, which may also have positive spillover e↵ects for low-skilled
men through beneficial societal externalities.
3.3 Measurement of data and sources
I conduct my analyses using micro-data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
Wave VI, around the year 2004. The macro-data come from a variety of sources, in-
cluding the Comparative Welfare States dataset (Huber et al. 1997, updated 2004 and
2In the regression models, I also used the variables “union bargaining coverage” and “wage disper-
sion” separately, in order to test other possible measures of the insider-outsider divide. These were,
however, insignificant.
2010); Gauthier Comparative Family Policy Database (2010); and OECD, Eurostat,
and World Bank data. The 18 OECD countries in the study are Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United
States. Table 3.2 contains descriptive statistics and values on the variables.
[Table 3.2 about here]
Following Brady and Burroway (2010), my dependent variable is poverty, defined as
poor = 1 (non-poor = 0) if s/he resides in a household with less than 50% of the median
household income. This definition of poverty is the standard that is commonly used
in cross-national poverty analyses (Brady 2003, Brady et al. 2009, Smeeding 2006).
Household income is calculated after taxes and transfers, using the standardized LIS
variable “DPI” (“net disposable income”). To adjust for household size, DPI is divided
by the square root of household members. I calculate the poverty threshold for each
country at 50% of median household income, including all individuals. To run my
logistic regression models on select segments of the population—by social risk group—
I reduce the sample to include only these specific groups; however, this is done after
calculating the overall population poverty threshold. I define the new social risk groups
by age, gender, and skill level (measured by education level). Table 3.3 presents the
mean values of the group composition by country and welfare state regime. I analyze the
e↵ects of social policies—ALMP, PLMP, EPL, family policy, and government spending
on daycare—along with union density and the percentage of seats held by women in
national parliaments, on individual-level poverty. To control for the economic context
within a country, I include the unemployment rate (OECD in Huber et al. 1997, 2010).
[Table 3.3 about here]
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3.3.1 Micro-level variables
My analyses include a set of individual-level control variables that capture demographic
variance in poverty outcomes. To capture the “economies of scale” e↵ect which assumes
that households with multiple members pool resources and expenses, I measure several
individual elements at the household level (Brady and Burroway 2010). These in-
clude binary variables for “No one employed” and “Multiple earners” in the household
(reference category = one earner). I use the LIS-standardized measures of education,
coded as binary values of “Head high education” and “Head low education” (reference
category = medium education)3. The other control variables include “Age of the house-
hold head,” “Children under age 5,” “Number of other adults in the household,” and
“Children under age 18 in the household.”
3.3.2 Macro-level variables
Data on employment protection legislation (EPL) are from the OECD (Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development) annual time series. The summary index
summarizes a number of sub-indices measuring the di culty of layo↵ (terms of notice,
severance pay, etc.) and regulations restricting the use of temporary work (Bradley and
Stephens 2007). This index is calculated along 18 basic items, which can be classified in
three main areas: 1) employment protection of regular workers against individual dis-
missal; 2) specific requirements for collective dismissals; and 3) regulation of temporary
forms of employment. The Active Labor Market Policy (ALMP) and Passive Labor
Market Policy (PLMP) variables are operationalized as public expenditure on active
3The categories are: 1) less than secondary (low), 2) secondary or some tertiary (medium), and 3)
completed tertiary or more (high).
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and passive labor market measures, respectively, as a percentage of GDP, divided by
the unemployed population. Both the EPL and ALMP/PLMP variables are standard
OECD measures that are widely used in welfare state studies.
Data on daycare is defined as “Public expenditure on day care/home-help services
as a % of GDP,” and comes from the OECD Social Expenditure database (“SOCX”).4
Data on family allowances are defined as “Total expenditure on family allowances in the
form of cash benefits as a percentage of the countries gross domestic product,” and come
from the OECD, as provided by Gauthier (2010).5 The union density variable, defined
as net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment,
comes from Jelle Visser’s union membership dataset (Visser 2011). The data for the
proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (expressed as a percentage)
comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The measure of welfare
generosity is defined as “gross public social expenditures as a percentage of current
GDP” (OECD).
3.3.3 Analytical Technique
The regression technique utilized in this paper is multi-level logistic regression using
random-intercept models6. The models are composed variously of di↵erent micro- and
macro-level independent variables (see Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 for models and results).
[Tables 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 about here.]
4www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure.
5OECD StatExtracts.Social and Welfare Statistics - Social Protection - Social Expenditure - Ag-
gregated data.(On-line: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx; accessed March 2010).
6Estimated in Stata 11 using the xtlogit command.
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Due to the clustering of individuals within countries and the inclusion of country-
level variables, the standard logistic regression model violates the assumption of inde-
pendent errors. Mixed logit models predict whether an individual is poor based on a
set of individual- and country-level variables. Based on Brady and Burroway (2010),
the random intercept model can be expressed in two equations. First, the log odds of
being poor for the ith individual in the j th country is represented by eta (⌘ij) and is a
function of country intercepts ( 0j), a set of fixed individual-level characteristics ( Xij)
and an error term (rij):
log(
pij
1  pij ) = ⌘ij =  0j +  Xij + rij (3.1)
Second, each country intercept ( 0j) is estimated as a function of an intercept ( 0Cj),
a set of country-level variables ( Cj), and an error term (u0j):
 0j =  0Cj +  Cj + u0j (3.2)
Because the analyses are limited to 18 countries, it is necessary to keep the models
parsimonious at level two, which is the country level. Additionally, due to multi-
collinearity between the macro-level policy variables7, I include only one macro-level
7The correlations range from .6-.9.
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variable in addition to one macro-level control variable per model.8
3.4 Results
The results of the multi-level logistic regression models are presented in Tables 3.4,
3.5, and 3.6. The analyses are conducted by grouping the sample into new social risk
categories, using three dependent variables: poverty of low-educated young males and
females (age 18-30), and low-educated older males (age 55-64).
Throughout all the models, the individual-level control variables are significant and
stable. Multiple earners, additional adults, and persons over age 65 in the household
all reduce the likelihood of poverty for the three groups (young low-educated males
and females, and older low-educated males). The presence of multiple earners in the
household reduces the odds of poverty by as much as a factor of 7.4 for young, low-
educated, males.9 For the female group, having multiple earners in the household
reduces the odds of poverty by 5.6, and for the older male group, the presence of
multiple earners yields a reduction in poverty odds by 4.1.
Conversely, having no one employed in the household, children 5 years old and under,
and a greater number of children in the household all increase the odds of poverty of
the three groups. If no one is employed in the household, the odds of poverty increase
by a factor of 4.8 for young low-educated men, around 3.5 for young low-educated
women, and 3.7 for older low-educated males. For young men, the number of children
in the household increases the odds of poverty by a factor of 1.3, while the presence
of children under 5 increases the odds of poverty by a factor of 1.5. Similarly, for
8The control variable is either “welfare generosity” in the case of the models that analyze the e↵ect
of social policies on poverty, or an economic context control (unemployment rate) for the models with
union density and women’s representation in parliament.
9To interpret odds ratios below 1.0, the inverse is taken. For example, an odds ratio of .5 is
interpreted as -1/.5 = -2.
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young women, the number of children increases the odds of poverty by a factor of 1.1,
and the presence of young children increases the odds of poverty by a factor of 1.3.
The economic context control variable, unemployment, is correctly signed in all models
(increasing poverty odds by a factor of 1) but remains insignificant in all models. The
welfare generosity control variable is insignificant in all models on the young groups,
but is highly significant and correctly signed (decreasing poverty odds by a factor of
1.1) in the older male group.10
The e↵ects of employment protection legislation (EPL) on poverty odds di↵er ac-
cording to the group under analysis. For both young low-skilled males and females,
higher EPL is associated with an increase in the odds of poverty, but the results are
not significant. For the older male group, however, EPL is associated with a decrease
in poverty odds (by a factor of 1.2), but again the results remain insignificant. Thus,
we can neither confirm nor disconfirm our expectation of an increase in poverty of
low-educated groups as a result of increased employment protection levels.
Across all models, active labor market policies (ALMP) are shown to be the most
important predictor of a decrease in poverty levels among the low skilled. The odds of
low-skilled young male poverty are reduced by a factor of 200 for one unit increase in
active labor market policy spending. The odds of ALMP reducing young low-skilled
female poverty are 1.25 times greater than that for young men (reduced by a factor
of 250). For older low-skilled men, the results show even more importance of active
labor market policies for reducing poverty than for the younger population—5 times as
much as for young women—looking both at the factor size and significance level. This
finding may indicate that ALMP are more e↵ectively targeted at older people, or that
10To keep the models parsimonious at level two (the country level), only one macro-level vari-
able is included per model per dependent-variable group (young low-educated male, female; older
low-educated male) along with the macro-level control variable of either unemployment or welfare
generosity.
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this group is better at responding to the opportunities provided by ALMP. Further
analysis of the components, provision, and take-up rates of active labor market policies
is a necessary next step.
The e↵ect of passive labor market policies (PLMP) on poverty is only significant for
the older male group, and strongly so: for one unit increase in the passive labor market
policy variable, the odds of poverty are reduced by a factor of 33.3. We see from these
results that passive labor market policies, such as unemployment insurance, are most
e↵ective for the financial well-being of older low-skilled males, while the younger groups
do not register a benefit from these passive measures. Furthermore, we observe a stark
contrast in reduction of poverty odds between active and passive labor market policies.
Active labor market measures have by far the more powerful e↵ect on the reduction of
the odds of poverty across all three groups.
The policies related to the family—which can be considered as work/family recon-
ciliation policies for the younger groups—are, as expected, related to a reduction in
poverty for the low-skilled young women and men. A one-unit increase in the family
policy allowances indicator yields a reduction of the odds of poverty by a factor of 1.4
for both the young female and male groups. For the older males, this e↵ect is insignifi-
cant though similarly signed. Daycare spending, on the other hand, is associated with
a reduction in the odds of poverty of older males by a factor of 2.1. For young men, the
e↵ect is not significant, but for young low-skilled women, the odds of poverty decline
by a factor of 2.2 with a one-unit increase in government daycare spending.
Union density is significant in reducing the odds of poverty of the older male group
by a factor of 1, while it is insignificant for both younger males and females. This
finding is consistent with the expectation that union density captures agency of actors
promoting policies that are aimed at old social risks, i.e. unemployment, disability,
sick leave, etc. of established workers. Conversely, the number of seats of women in
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national parliaments—a proxy for agents developing policies aimed at new social risks
relating to gender equality and work-family balance, among others—has a significant
e↵ect in reducing the odds of poverty for young low-skilled women by a factor of 1.
This measure has an equal e↵ect on the reduction of poverty odds for the older male
group, also by a factor of 1. This finding o↵ers support for the hypothesis that the
greater the representation of women in national parliaments, the greater the chances
of having policies that are associated with a reduction in poverty among women and
also of old social risk groups (of at least 55 years of age) who may be at risk because
of obsolete skills.
Table 3.3 shows the percentages of the new social risk groups within the population,
and the percentage within the age and gender groups that is low skilled. Summarizing
the e↵ects of policies when looking at the composition of the population by group
type (defined by gender/age/skill-level) provides insight into the e cacy of particular
countries’ policy mixes in combating new social risks. While it can be said that the
Nordic welfare regime as a whole provides better coverage against social risk, looking at
individual country profiles gives a more accurate picture of government e↵ort against
risk. While the Nordic welfare regime clearly protects older low-skilled males against
poverty to a much better degree than the Continental or Liberal welfare regimes, the
picture for the younger population is less clear. It is true that the Nordic countries have
lower percentages of youth in poverty than the other regimes, but it is young, low-skilled
males in particular that complicate the story. Denmark, for example, appears as an
anomaly; it shows an unexpectedly high percentage of young low-skilled men in poverty
(15.1% compared to a mean of 11.4% in the Continental countries). This is particularly
unusual given Denmark’s higher than average spending on ALMP, but it also has higher
than average spending on PLMP. The combination of active and passive labor market
policies in this country does not seem to be adequately protecting its low-skilled youth
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from poverty, whereas the older population seems to be benefiting disproportionately.
As expected, in all welfare state regimes, young low-skilled women are worse o↵
than their male counterparts. However, this di↵erence is most stark in the Liberal
welfare regime. The Liberal Anglophone countries have the lowest percentages of seats
of women in parliament compared to the other two welfare state regimes, and similarly
the lowest amount of government spending on daycare facilities. Looking at the welfare
regime groups as a whole, one would conclude that the Liberal countries o↵er the least
protection against social risk for women. However, looking at individual countries again
provides a refined assessment: Australia, for example, has higher than average daycare
spending and family allowances, and its young low-skilled women are indeed much
better o↵ compared to their peers in the other Anglophone countries, with a group
poverty rate of 11.5% compared to the regime mean of 25.7%. This is particularly
striking when noting that young low-skilled females comprise the biggest share of the
population (6.7%) in Australia out of all the countries under analysis.
Lastly, older low-skilled males fare far better in countries where mechanisms of old
social risk protection are strongly in place. Where union density is higher, older low-
skilled males are better protected against the risk of poverty. Looking at the individual
country profiles, we see for example that Spain has the highest percentage of older
low-educated men in poverty (16.7%) out of both the Continental and Nordic welfare
regimes, and by far the lowest union density (15.5%) out of all the countries in the
sample, save for France (8%) and the United States (12%). Similarly, Spain’s spending
on PLMP (.14%)—shown in this paper’s analyses to protect older males via its passive
insider income-protection mechanism—is one of the lowest in Europe. Italy shares
a similar country profile with Spain in this regard, providing evidence of a southern
European welfare regime that is distinguishable from the other regimes.
Analyzing welfare regimes grouped together as a whole, coupled with scrutiny of
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individual country profiles, yields nuanced evaluation of the policy e↵ects found in this
paper’s analyses. This paper o↵ers evidence for the argument that the three worlds of
welfare capitalism famously brought to light by Esping-Andersen (1990) are in need of
refined categorization as policies and populations continue to adapt to changing times.
Future research will need to take this paper’s analyses, based around the year 2004,
and apply them to policies and societies that exist today under greater financial and
economic strain.
3.5 Conclusion
In the political economies of Europe today, measures of “old risk” prevention such as
unemployment insurance and sick pay exist alongside “new risk” profiles that center
on skill level and opportunity for participation in the labor market. The capacity to
adequately cope with these risks will be unevenly distributed among citizens based on
levels of education, income, and policy formulation. The new risk target group, or
group most a↵ected by the structure of new social risks, does not possess a su cient
attachment to the labor market to deal with the financial imposition that these risks
imply. New risks have mainly to do with entering the labor market and establishing an
enduring position in it, and with care duties that arise principally at the early stage of
family-formation. However, many scholars have recently drawn attention to the later
risks posed to families of providing long-term care for frail, dependent, elderly (Saraceno
2010, Knijn and Ostner 2002). Individuals who are able to successfully navigate the
transition to solid, paid employment, as well as those who develop strategies of care-
taking using independent means, will not experience the urgency of these new social
risks.
Thus we see how polarization comes into the picture: new social risks pose a problem
mainly to certain subsets of the population: these include those with lower education
46
and less access to training, and those who do not have available recourse to the family
or the market for provision of family care services for children and/or the elderly.
In this paper, I have analyzed the e↵ects of common social policy instruments—
active labor market policies, passive labor market policies, employment protection,
family policies, daycare—along with union density and women’s representation in par-
liament, on the poverty levels of low skilled segments of national populations. I found
that generally speaking, social policies contribute to the reduction of poverty. Specifi-
cally, active labor market policies–involving public employment services, training pro-
grams, and employment subsidies for the un- and under-employed—significantly reduce
poverty of all three groups under analysis: low-skilled young women and men, and low-
skilled older men. Notably, passive labor market policies, which are most often in the
form of unemployment insurance, are most helpful in alleviating the poverty of older
low-skilled men. This finding is in line with our expectation that passive labor market
policies are generally targeted at those who have already contributed to the workforce
and who receive passive income assistance in exchange for such service—a mechanism
that does not help to relieve the poverty of low-skilled youth who do not have such em-
ployment history. This expectation about the di↵erence in mechanism, e↵ectiveness,
and aim between active vs. passive labor market policies is borne out in the data.
In the same vein, union density is found to be significant and positively related to
lowering the poverty of older low-skilled men, but not of the younger groups. This
finding may reflect the varying capacity of unions to protect the income of jobs across
a wide spectrum, as opposed to protection within privileged sectors in which mostly
older men work.
Family allowances are notable for significantly lowering the odds of poverty of both
younger men and women, but not for lowering that of older men. This finding o↵ers
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evidence for the positive e↵ects of generous family policy on the income of young low-
skilled adults, who rely on child benefits to o↵set the financial hardship that comes
from child-rearing.
The analyses in this paper shed light on the di↵erent ways in which social policies
are e↵ective in combating poverty across low-skilled segments of the population. In one
of the first multi-level statistical analyses combining micro- and macro-level data to ad-
dress policy e↵ectiveness, the paper contributes to contemporary studies of public policy
and the welfare state. There are several directions for future research based on these
findings. First, researchers will need to overcome the inherent limitations of the data,
including di↵erentiating between di↵erent types of active labor market policies, for ex-
ample (i.e. employment services vs. training programs vs. employment subsidization),
as well as studying the di↵erent components that comprise contemporary family-policy
packages (child benefits in cash vs. the length and structure of paid parental leave).
Furthermore, while this paper’s study provides insight on policy and poverty interac-
tions in a post-Third Way era, it is a static snapshot of one time point (roughly the
year 2004) across multiple countries. Future research will benefit from providing anal-
yses that extend across time in addition to across countries, to show the diverse policy
trajectories that have di↵ering impacts on the poverty of certain groups. Furthermore,
as social risk profiles continue to develop, future studies will need to emphasize the
interaction between gender, age, and skill level, and examine how vulnerabilities arise
di↵erently across di↵erent welfare regimes. The path to poverty reduction is likely not
a one-size-fits-all approach, but rather one that will combine elements from diverse
national approaches.
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4 Does Labor Market Dualization Translate into Welfare State
Dualization? The case of Germany
4.1 Introduction
The modern postindustrial welfare state is confronted with a unique set of challenges.
For the welfare state to remain viable in the face of increasing dependency ratios of the
inactive to active population, social benefits must not overly burden the public purse,
yet still provide a substantial measure of social well-being for citizens. Politicians
know that decreasing social benefits is an unpopular and costly move, but businesses
demand competitiveness in the midst of increasing internationalization, and do not
want to shoulder too many social costs on behalf of their employees. How to balance
social benefit provision with postindustrialized labor markets is a question that has
become increasingly relevant for the modern welfare state. The welfare state must also
adapt to providing benefits to those in di↵erent segments of the labor force, without
resulting in a situation of unbalanced social privilege.
One development that has steadily gained the attention of welfare state scholars
is that of an emerging dualism between those who are able to retain their social en-
titlements in the postindustrial era, and those who face dwindling social protection
and increasing vulnerability. The distinction between the two groups lies mainly in the
labor market, between those who have stable and secure employment and those who
do not (Rueda 2005). However, dualism is also seen as having emerged within and
issuing from the state itself, in the form of dualizing social policy (Palier and Thelen
2010). This development has occurred most markedly in the Continental European, or
Bismarckian, welfare states. These countries are interesting cases for the study of so-
cial and labor market dualization because rather than representing frozen institutional
structures that are resistant to change in spite of inherent structural problems, these
political systems have undergone piecemeal transformations that, arguably, have re-
sulted in increasing labor market and social welfare inequalities (Clegg 2007; Eichhorst
and Marx 2011; Eichhorst and Hemerijck 2010; Palier and Thelen 2010; Davidsson and
Naczyk 2009).
In this paper, I examine one country in particular—Germany—which is considered
to be a prime example of a Bismarckian, social-insurance based, welfare state. I pro-
pose answers to three fundamental questions: 1) whether there are more labor market
outsiders in Germany today than there were twenty years ago; 2) whether these labor
market outsiders are indeed worse o↵ today than two decades ago; and 3) whether the
welfare state increases or lessens this dualism. To answer these questions, I employ
data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and analyze the income—both pre-
and post-welfare state involvement (i.e. pre- and post-taxes and transfers)—of those
determined to be labor market outsiders and insiders. My analyses utilize five waves of
the LIS data for Germany: 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000, and 20041. The operationalization
of labor market insiders and outsiders comes from Husermann and Schwander (2011)
and Kitschelt and Rehm (2006), and utilizes occupation as the principal indicator of
outsiderness, further refined by gender. The basis for this classification comes from sur-
vey data with which individuals are identified who are most at risk of unemployment
and/or atypical employment. Individuals are considered to be outsiders if they are typ-
ically a↵ected by atypical work and unemployment throughout their work biography,
based on the characteristics of their occupational reference group. The occupations are
1www.lisdatacenter.org.
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classified using the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO) 2-digit codes2.
In a second step, I add the currently unemployed and those “not in the labor force”
to the above operationalization of outsiders. Doing so reveals two interesting conclu-
sions that contrast with relying solely on occupational group alone. First, including the
unemployed shows an increase in outsiders in Germany over time. Second, by includ-
ing the currently unemployed in the operationalization of labor market outsiders, the
welfare state is shown to have a positive e↵ect by narrowing the income gap between
insiders and outsiders over two decades.
4.2 Conceptualization/Measurement of Insider-Outsider
The concept of a divide between “insiders” and “outsiders” in postindustrial economies
has received increasing scholarly attention in recent years. However, clear measure-
ment of insiders and outsiders has yet to be established. On the contrary, there exist
only a couple of explicitly defined measures of insiders and outsiders in contemporary
political science/social policy literature, which I discuss here. Rueda (2005) divides
insiders and outsiders along one dimension: employment status. He defines insiders
as “those with secure employment,” and outsiders as “those without.” He goes on to
define insiders as “those workers with highly protected jobs, su ciently protected not
to feel greatly threatened by high levels of unemployment.” He defines outsiders to be
“either unemployed or hold[ing] jobs characterized by low salaries and low levels of
protection, employment rights, benefits, and social security privileges.” (Rueda 2005:
62). His measure of insiders is those workers who are “employed full-time with a per-
manent job or as those with part-time or fixed-term jobs who do not want a full-time
or permanent job” (Rueda 2005: 63). His measure of outsiders, then, are “those who
2See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/.
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are unemployed, employed full-time in fixed-term and temporary jobs (unless they do
not want a permanent job), employed part-time (unless they do not want a full-time
job), and studying. Students are included in the outsider category both because they
have no certainties about their future employment (even those who hope to become
insiders or upscale managers can end up unemployed) and because in some cases they
may have extended their education because of di culties entering the labor market”
(Rueda 2005: 63).
Husermann and Schwander (2011) measure insider-outsider status in a di↵erent
way. They conceptualize outsiderness as not resulting merely from a static incidence
of ones employment status, but rather as an employment biography profile. That is,
whether a person is currently employed or not has less bearing on outsider status, they
argue, than the persons general likelihood of being employed or unemployed over her
life course. Therefore, they measure insiders and outsiders in terms of occupations,
classifying individuals into insider-occupations and outsider-occupations based on sur-
vey evidence of the incidence of unemployment or atypical employment by occupational
group. The occupations are classified using the International Labour Organization’s
(ILO) International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) 2-digit codes. This
way of measuring insiders and outsiders takes social class as the basis for the classifica-
tion of occupational groups; it draws on Kitschelt and Rehms (2005) division of social
classes in postindustrial societies into five classes that share similar work conditions and
rates of precariousness (Husermann and Schwander 2011). For each occupational group
(see group names and descriptions above), Husermann and Schwander compute “the
group-specific rate of unemployment and the rate of atypical employment (including
part-time employment as well as temporary or fixed-term employment depending on
the data availability in the respective survey), compare it to the average in the work-
force, and test whether the di↵erence is significant. Occupational groups that have a
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significantly higher rate of either unemployment or atypical employment are defined
as outsiders. Consequently, all individuals in these groups are then treated as out-
siders” (ibid.). Rather than a generalized measure that is the same across countries,
Husermann and Schwanders measure of outsiderness thus varies by country.
Lastly, outsiders and insiders have been measured not by labor force status, but by
access to social rights and benefits. Here the distinction between the two groups lies in
access to social insurance (insiders) versus the lower-level social assistance (outsiders)
(cf. Davidsson and Naczyk 2009). This measurement applies mainly to Bismarckian
welfare states, in which social protection is provided in the form of benefits derived
from employment, whereas means-tested social assistance is regarded as a residual tool
for prevention of poverty among the most marginalized. However, this di↵erentiation
between social insurance and social assistance begs the further question of di↵erential
access to occupational pension and health insurance schemes.
Summarizing the various measures of insiderness and outsiderness allows for assess-
ment of their respective strengths and weaknesses. Ruedas measure, while favorable
perhaps for its simplicity, remains the same for all countries. One could argue that
his measure fails to account for the nuances in welfare regimes and social policies that
directly bear on whether someone is an insider or outsider. In contrast, Husermann
and Schwander’s definition of outsider varies significantly across countries. While their
measure captures more variation in welfare arrangements, labor markets, and educa-
tional systems than does Ruedas, their measure ends up being synonymous with gender
in the case of Germany, for example. Equating outsiderness with being female leaves
unanswered questions, such as how outsiders can be exclusively women even when, as
in the case of Germany, women have entered the labor market in greater numbers in
the last decades than ever before. This paper utilizes Husermann and Schwanders mea-
sure of outsiderness and builds upon it, by also including the unemployed and those
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not in the labor force. I find that depending on the measure used, di↵erent results
are obtained, which paves the way for subsequent analyses that di↵erentiate between
employment biography and current labor force status.
Furthermore, all the measures summarized here focus on individual labor market
status as an indicator of outsiderness, but remain silent on how households fall into
outsider status. This is problematic because poverty must be assessed at the household
level, not the individual level. The measures available in contemporary political science
and social policy literature thus focus on only one conceptualization of insider-outsider
status—the individual within the labor market—leaving a large lacuna. There is a
strong need for analyses that focus on the household level, given that it is at this level
that welfare benefits accrue and household members pool their resources. Further-
more, the issue of taxation must be considered, and it is broadly known that especially
Bismarckian welfare regimes manage taxes at the household, and not individual, level.
While an individual may be an outsider in the labor market, he/she may live within
a household that is headed by an insider, and vice versa. The implications of this can-
not be overlooked: a labor-market “outsider” may enjoy su cient benefits if she resides
in an insider-headed household. This is particularly likely to be the case in the Bismar-
ckian countries, where women have traditionally been the second, marginal, earners,
and their spouses have been the primary breadwinners with adequate social protec-
tion coverage for the household. This paper’s analyses therefore utilize the household
level because this level most accurately reflects social policy provision and coverage.
Dualization in the labor market (an individual-level phenomenon) is not necessarily
mirrored by dualization of the welfare state (a household-level occurrence).
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4.3 The Emergence of Insiders vs. Outsiders
4.3.1 Outsiders in the Labor Market
In this paper, I focus on two dimensions of outsiderness: labor market position, and so-
cial protection coverage. The general view in the literature on segmented labor markets
has been that the institutionalization of di↵erent rules of labor market operation has
separated workers into “core” and “periphery,” with the former being able to maintain
good, adequate, jobs, and the latter getting squeezed into the remaining, inferior, jobs
that may result in enduring diminished labor market status (Davidsson and Naczyk
2009). Today, fewer people’s work biographies reflect the stable, protected, socially in-
sured, su ciently paying jobs of the era of industrial employment. Increasing numbers
of people have inconsistent employment biographies, which may be interrupted by long
periods of study, childcare and/or eldercare, job-seeking, and reflect the greater diver-
sity of jobs and employment scenarios available today. This diversity of employment
(including self-employment, part-time, fixed-term contracts, mini-jobs) may result in
disadvantages such as decreased pay, welfare losses, lack of social and/or political inte-
gration, and limited opportunity for career advancement or pay increases.
However, whether individuals who find themselves in precarious employment actu-
ally su↵er monetary losses or losses of well-being—as measured by welfare state coverage
and protection—is an empirical question that warrants exploration. If there is indeed
an increasingly dualized division of labor market participants into the categories of in-
siders and outsiders, which I test in this paper in Germany over time, it is important to
consider whether state policy is e↵ective in reducing the magnitude of this divide. For
this reason, I examine the e↵ect of the welfare state—i.e. of taxes and transfers—on
the income of two subsections of the population, labor market insiders and outsiders,
classified according to occupation and labor market status.
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4.3.2 Outsiders in terms of Social Protection
Germany is a foundational bedrock of Bismarckian welfare states, in which social pro-
tection is administered in the form of welfare rights and coverage through employment.
Social assistance, providing less social coverage than the employment-based social insur-
ance, is seen as a less substantial, residual tool that is reserved for the most marginalized
segments of society as a means of poverty alleviation (Davidsson and Naczyk 2009).
However, as jobs become more precarious and careers increasingly interrupted (or be-
gun late), the capacity of social insurance to protect people from social risks declines.
Workers may not be able to pay contributions for the amount of time required in order
to receive full benefits, and some jobs do not o↵er unemployment insurance while pro-
viding only very low levels of pension coverage (Palier and Thelen 2010). I will discuss
these “mini-jobs” and marginal employment in Germany in further detail below.
In conservative continental European welfare regimes, social protection insiders are
therefore those who are able to make the required contributions to receive social in-
surance coverage, while outsiders are those who do not fall under the social insurance
umbrella, relying instead on residual social assistance. The implications of this are man-
ifold: a crucial point of consideration is whether social protection outsiders are able
to avoid falling into poverty. Furthermore, given the social stigma that is attached to
drawing on social assistance as opposed to being covered through the insurance system,
the political (and social) behavior of outsiders may indeed reflect the disenchantment
of a socially disadvantaged group.
4.4 Bismarckian Welfare State Change: Germany
Germany presents an interesting case for analysis of insider-outsider dynamics and for
testing whether dualization within the welfare state—and of outcomes—has in fact oc-
curred over time. As has become apparent among welfare state scholars, Germany’s
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political economy (and that of other Continental European welfare regimes, particu-
larly France) has undergone significant restructuring over the past two decades, through
gradual, piecemeal, reforms that have produced cumulatively large e↵ects (Palier and
Thelen 2010; Palier and Martin 2007). While the fundamental tripartite bargaining
within Germany’s political economy has not entirely eroded, firms have increasingly
become the locus for determining labor contracts, and rather than complete deregu-
lation of labor markets, an increasing number of jobs reflect atypical or nonstandard
employment. These developments have occurred alongside an increase in the number
of working poor. And while participants in the core economy have been able to defend
established institutions from which they themselves benefit, the universal bargaining
coverage that once followed as a result is now considered to be an outdated concept,
no longer possible in the modern postindustrial economy.
Following the labor-shedding strategy of the 1980s, which has since become viewed
as a general policy failure, employers and the remaining workforce in the core manu-
facturing sector turned toward firm-based negotiations to preserve job security in the
face of increasing flexibility. As the core industry lost its ability to secure labor rights
across the broader workforce, a secondary labor market gradually emerged in which
nonstandard employment options became more prevalent. The new rules of the sec-
ondary labor market centered on flexibility and less security, which in turn fostered a
secondary mode of welfare protection. As Palier and Thelen (2010) illustrate, where
there exist welfare systems that are premised on the existence of a separation of social
risks and welfare coverage—as in Germany with the contribution-based welfare provi-
sion (rather than financed by general taxation)—the emergence of new types of jobs
that do not contribute to the social insurance funds will necessarily undermine the
system. As a result, welfare reforms emphasized a stricter demarcation between social
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insurance, based on having “paid into” the system in the form of payroll contribu-
tions, and social assistance, which is intended to provide for those outside the standard
employment contract.
4.4.1 The Changing Nature of Employment in Germany
As the protected status of core workers in standard employment has been maintained,
the conditions for non-standard employment have evolved around a status quo of more
flexibility. Additionally, the development of a broad range of services (e.g. construction,
goods delivery, child care, elder care, restaurants, personal services) has resulted in
a secondary labor market, characterized by non-standard employment contracts and
lower standards in compensation, working condition, and social protection (Palier and
Thelen 2010). Trade unions in Germany and other European countries have been able
to maintain strict employment protection for the core workers, at the expense of an
easing of restrictions in conditions for those working outside the core sectors. Germany
has seen an increase in atypical jobs since the mid-1980s, with this trend continuing to
grow through the past two decades, despite the fact that these jobs provide less pay
and fewer benefits than that of standard workers. In other words, though the jobs are
not necessarily “good,” and though the incidence of working poverty has increased,
the number of non-standard jobs has continued to grow. As Bleses and Seeleib-Kaiser
note in their account of the dual transformation of the German welfare state, the ratio
of regular-to-atypical employment in the 1970s was 5:1, but by the mid-1980s, the
ratio had become 3:1, and by the mid-1990s, the ratio had sunk to 2:1 (Bleses and
Seeleib-Kaiser 2004).
While temporary workers comprise one group within nonstandard employment,
“mini-jobbers” make up another significant component. Holders of these jobs perform
low-level, part-time work that is not fully covered by social insurance contributions.
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While holders of mini-jobs have health insurance as part of the public health insur-
ance system in Germany, they are not eligible for unemployment benefits, and the
pension entitlements are exceedingly low, given that they are based on already-low
earnings levels. Employment in mini-jobs has risen steadily over the past two decades,
increasing from 2 million mini-jobs in 1991 to 4.7 million in 2005, with another 1.7
million mini-jobs being taken as second jobs, which was not allowed prior to legisla-
tion of the Red-Green government under Gerhard Schrder in 2002 (Ebbinghaus and
Eichhorst 2007). Moreover, and what has strong implications for this paper’s analyses
of labor market dualization, an estimated 20 to 40 percent of all low-skilled Germans
work in mini-jobs (Mitlacher 2007). Thus, what we are seeing in modern-day German
labor market developments is an increasing segmentation of the labor force between
the “haves” and the “have-nots”: those who have standard employment with adequate
wages and social protection, and those who do not.
4.4.2 The Gender Component
We turn now to a discussion of who is most at risk of being a “have-not” in the labor
market. While the low-skilled segment of the population is an obvious suspect, the
distinction between insiders and outsiders has a strong and distinct gender component.
The gender divide stems from the location of the bulk of these mini-jobs, which are not
within the core economy, but are found in the service economy. While it can be argued
that the increase in di↵erent types of work reflects an opening up of the economy to
allow women’s (and other under-employed segments of the population) participation
in the labor force, the tradeo↵ between type of job and quality of job is not always
favorable. Women’s groups in Germany have o↵ered criticism of jobs that carry few
benefits, given that these jobs are filled in large part by women. The growth of the
low-wage service sector has enabled many women to fill jobs; however, the structure of
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marginal employment and its accompanying social benefits has not altered the country’s
traditional profile of the male breadwinner model.
Marginal part-time employment in Germany, which exempts employers from payroll
contributions up to a wage threshold of 400 euros, comprises a typical employment
pattern in private services (Eichhorst and Marx 2010). While this form of employment
is seen as attractive for married women who benefit from their spouses’ insider jobs that
provide social insurance coverage, it leaves single women outside the social protection
scheme. From a gender equality perspective, marginal part-time employment that is
not covered by social insurance but is significantly filled by women leaves a gaping
lacuna in ensuring equal status and protection between women and men. Furthermore,
Germany provides particularly fertile ground for wage inequality. Collective bargaining
is weak in market-related services and there is no legal minimum wage, leaving wage
dispersion higher in Germany than in other Bismarckian countries, and leaving atypical
workers particularly vulnerable.
4.4.3 Welfare Policy Reform
The German government has undertaken various reforms to refine the distinction be-
tween contributory social insurance and non-contributory, state-financed, income-tested
assistance that is targeted at the neediest segments of the population. The Red-Green
government under Schrder implemented arguably the most significant of these reforms,
and certainly the most prevalent in popular discourse: the so-called “Hartz IV” reforms.
This set of labor market reforms is named after the head of the commission, Peter Hartz,
that proposed the changes in 2002. The various stages of the Hartz reforms took place
between 2003-2005, with the most well known of these, Hartz IV, going into e↵ect on
January 1, 2005. The first three stages of the Hartz reforms involved changes to the
Federal Labor Agency, the creation of mini-jobs, various grants for entrepreneurs, and
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structural and procedural changes to job centers.
The Hartz IV reform transformed the system of unemployment benefits from a
three-tiered system, which had been comprised of unemployment insurance with bene-
fits related to earnings; unemployment assistance, with lower benefits but still earnings-
related; and social assistance, which was means-tested. The new system consists of only
two levels: 1) insurance benefits based on earnings and 2) flat-rate, income-tested, so-
cial assistance. The duration of unemployment insurance was also shortened from 32
to 18 months for older workers, and to 12 months for other workers. In this vein, the
Hartz IV reform moved away from a system of status maintenance or income support
for labor market outsiders, and toward a system of means-tested poverty reduction for
these groups. In other words, for labor market outsiders, unemployment protection for
outsiders in Germany has taken a neoliberal turn that mirrors Anglophone “Liberal”
welfare states in terms of benefits, but has maintained a continental Bismarckian in-
surance system for labor market insiders, which still aims at this group’s status- and
income-maintenance.
The central question, then, is whether such dualization within welfare state policy
produces a duality of social-wellbeing outcomes (measured here by income) between
those who are considered to be labor market insiders and those considered to be out-
siders. Tracing causality between policy reform and income losses can be complicated
by intervening factors such as a general change in the economy—slow growth, high un-
employment, and population aging—not to mention times of fiscal austerity. However,
we know some troubling trends: since 2000, income inequality and poverty have grown
faster in Germany than in any other OECD country, having increased by more percent-
age points between 2000-2005 than in the previous 15 years (1985-2000) (OECD 2008).
Wage inequality and dispersion have grown in Germany, where collective bargaining
is weak in market-related services. Since many companies exist outside the scope of
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collective bargaining, coupled with the lack of a binding wage floor, Germany appears
to be the least poised to contain pressure for wage inequality among the Bismarckian
welfare states (Eichhorst and Marx 2010). Moreover, the incidence of long-term un-
employment has increased substantially in Germany. In 2006, 57% of the unemployed
were without a job for 12 months or longer, compared with 44% in 1994 (Fleckenstein
et al. 2011).
4.4.4 Classification of Occupations into Post-industrial Class Groups
To examine whether there has been an increase in the proportion of labor market out-
siders to insiders in Germany between 1984-2004, I base the main definition of the two
groups on occupational class. Labor market outsiders are those who are most at risk
of being in atypical employment or of falling into unemployment. Grouped according
to occupation, their work biographies reflect a generalized increased risk of experienc-
ing a weakened attachment to the labor force over the course of their lives. While
atypical and un-/under-employment have been established in the political science liter-
ature as the core determinants of outsiderness (Rueda 2005, 2006, 2007; Emmenegger
2009; Davidsson and Naczyk 2009), this paper utilizes Husermann and Schwander’s
(2011) classification of outsiders based on the notion of extended risk profiles. For
example, women in conservative continental European welfare states may be employed
for a time but will likely interrupt their employment and/or careers in the event of
childbirth and child/family care duties. Conversely, those who experience temporary
spells of unemployment may not necessarily remain unemployed or experience a recur-
ring risk of such unemployment. Therefore, utilizing one’s occupational reference group
rather than relying solely on a given employment status at one point in time provides a
deeper theoretical basis for identifying labor market exclusion and exposure to the risk
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of continuing outsiderness. In a second step, I combine the survey evidence-based oc-
cupational risk groups with those currently unemployed, and show that the conclusions
we can draw about outsiders in Germany depend on the operationalization.
Using occupational profiles as the starting point for di↵erentiating between labor
market insiders and outsiders enables us to distinguish between low-skilled and high-
skilled workers, and identify similar work conditions and levels of employment insecu-
rity. In this paper, I use Kitschelt and Rehm’s (2005) five occupational class groups,
based on Oesch (2006), along with Husermann and Schwander’s (2011) survey analy-
ses as the bases for my definition of labor market insiders and outsiders in Germany.3
These class groups are the following: 1) Capital accumulators (high-skilled managers,
self-employed, experts); 2) Socio-cultural professionals (high-skilled professionals in in-
terpersonal professions, mostly in the public and private service sector); 3) Blue-collar
workers (skilled and unskilled); 4) interpersonal services workers (skilled and unskilled);
5) o ce workers (skilled and routine). This classification into socioeconomic groups uti-
lizes ISCO-88 2-digit occupational codes.4
Labor market classification is further refined by gender and age. There is a strong
gender dimension to postindustrial economies, given the large-scale entry of women into
tertiary education and employment (Esping-Andersen 1999; Esping-Andersen 2009;
Taylor-Gooby 2004; Kitschelt and Rehm 2006). Female workers may be especially
prone to disadvantage in conservative European welfare states—of which Germany,
this paper’s analytical case, is an archetype—as their often interrupted employment bi-
ographies result in incomplete social insurance, since welfare benefits are proportional
to contributions (Bradley et al. 2003). Younger and older workers also face di↵erent
3For details on the operationalization of labor market insiders and outsiders based on rates of
unemployment and atypical employment that were calculated using ISSP, ESS, and Eurobarometer
data, see Husermann and Schwander (2011).
4See Figure 4.6 for classification of occupations and corresponding ISCO88-2d codes.
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risk structures and exposure to unemployment and labor market exclusion.
4.4.5 Operationalization of key variables and concepts
Details of operationalization and definitions of the key variables and concepts employed
in the paper’s analyses are presented in Figure 4.7. As discussed above, outsiders are
all individuals who belong to social groups (defined by class, gender, and age) that are
significantly more exposed to the risks of unemployment or atypical employment in a
particular welfare regime (Husermann and Schwander 2011). For continental welfare
regimes, outsiders are classified as 100% female, based on survey evidence from Euro-
pean Social Survey (ESS) Waves 2002 and 2008; International Social Survey Programme
(ISSP) Role of Government, Waves 1996 and 2006 and ISSP Work Orientations Wave
2005; and Eurobarometer 44.3 (1996). These female outsiders are classified into the
following categories: 1) Low service functionaries, above and below 40 years of age; 2)
Socio-cultural professionals, above and below age 40; 3) Blue collar workers above and
below age 40; 4) Mixed-service functionaries above and below age 40. Neither males
nor capital accumulators of either sex were found to be outsiders using Husermann
and Schwander’s (2011) definition of outsiders—i.e. having significantly higher rates of
atypical employment and unemployment than the group-specific average.5
To examine insider-outsider outcomes in terms of monetary well-being and income,
I compare gross income of the two groups at the household level. Using LIS data, I
examine market income before taxes and transfers. The disposable income of insiders
and outsiders captures income after the welfare state is taken into account. At the
household-level, this measure is the LIS variable “dpi,” which measures net household
5Significance level  0.1. For details on this outsider classification, see Husermann and Schwander
2011.
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disposable income after taxes and transfers.
The disposable and gross income ratios are the ratios of outsiders’ disposable and
gross incomes to the disposable and gross incomes of insiders. The income gap is
measured as [1 - (ratio of gross (net) wage of outsiders to gross (net) wage of insiders)].
The e↵ect of taxes and transfers—i.e. the welfare state—is calculated as the di↵erence
between the gross income gap and net income gap, multiplied by 100.
4.4.6 Findings and Implications
This paper sheds light on the question of whether the welfare state has reduced or
increased labor market dualism in Germany over time. The German welfare state
reduces the income gap at the household level between occupational insiders and out-
siders. Over time, the welfare state reduces the di↵erence in insider and outsider
household-level gross and disposable incomes by 1.3 percentage points in 1984, and by
2.8 percentage points in 2004, as can be seen in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1. The blip in
this consistently reducing trend occurs at the time point 1994, where the income gap
between insiders and outsiders is narrowed only by 0.9 percentage points, compared
to the previous years’ 1.3% (1984) and 1.5% (1989). This anomaly can be explained
because it is, in fact, not unexpected, given the strains on the welfare state of German
reunification in 1990 following the collapse of communism.
The social protection of the German welfare state is aimed at households rather
than individuals, in line with Germany’s historical orientation toward insurance for
the male breadwinner, following the traditional conservative Bismarckian model. This
household orientation leaves individuals and especially women, who comprise 100% of
those in outsider occupations in Germany6, out of the protected schema. Therefore,
the question of whether labor market outsiders have become better or worse o↵ over
6Based on the survey evidence provided by Husermann and Schwander (2011).
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Figure 4.1: E↵ect of the Welfare State via Taxes & Transfers on the Household-Level
Income Gap between Insiders and Outsiders
Note: The value indicates the change in the income gap due to taxes and transfers (in % points).
“Outsiders” operationalized here as current occupational class group: 1) Low service functionaries;
2) Socio-cultural professionals; 3) Blue collar workers; 4) Mixed-service functionaries.
Source: LIS; author’s calculations.
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Figure 4.2: E↵ect of the Welfare State via Taxes & Transfers on the Household-Level
Income Gap between Insiders and Outsiders
Note: “Outsiders” here includes the unemployed and those not in the labor force. The value
indicates the change in the income gap due to taxes and transfers (in % points).
Source: LIS; author’s calculations.
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Figure 4.3: Percentage Employed in Insider vs. Outsider Occupations in Germany Over
Time
Source: LIS.
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Figure 4.4: Percentage of Insiders and Outsiders (including the unemployed/not in
labor force) in Germany Over Time
Source: LIS.
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time requires a response that is conditioned by the level of welfare protection. The case
of Germany shows that the household remains a “better place” for those in outsider
occupations, given the narrowing of the income gap between insiders and outsiders at
this level.
The question of whether there are more outsiders in Germany today than was the
case twenty years ago reveals conclusions that vary according to operationalization. As
shown in Figure 4.3, using Husermann and Schwander’s (2011) occupational classifica-
tion of outsiders based on survey evidence, I do not find a steady increase in outsiders
over time.7 We see a slight increase in outsiders in 1989 and 1994 (to 41%, up from
40% in 1984). In fact, the percentage of outsiders as classified from the occupational
groups identified above is found to slightly decrease overall, from 41% to 39%.8
The important distinction to note here is that the occupation-based measure of
outsiderness captures only those who are employed in the occupations that are classified
as outsider occupations. However, when the definition of outsiders is expanded to
include respondents who are either unemployed, technically “not in the labor force”
(students, housewives/-husbands, and for reasons unknown/not given), or simply “not
employed,” a di↵erent picture emerges. We see a rising percentage of outsiders in
Germany over time, as shown in Figure 4. This rising percentage of outsiders exists
alongside a diminishing percentage of insiders, who remain defined here in terms of
occupation.
Similarly, when operationalizing outsiders to include the unemployed/not in the
labor force, the e↵ect of the welfare state is positive. Taxes and transfers narrow the
7Results based on adults over age 16 who are currently engaged in employment, retired, or near
retirement. Results do not include the unemployed or those who are not in the labor force.
8Note: Similar results were obtained using the definition of outsiders that is based on Chapter Two
of my dissertation: low-skilled young men and women aged 18-30, and low-skilled older men aged
55-64.
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income gap between labor market insiders and outsiders, as shown in Table 4.1 and
Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Again, in all years, the welfare state is advantageous to outsiders:
it diminishes the income gap between the two groups by a large degree, ranging from a
reduction of 15.3 to 21.7%. The equalizing e↵ect of taxes and transfers on the income
di↵erence between insiders and outsiders peaks in the year 2000 after a mostly steady
increase, before dipping in 2004. This likely reflects the generous welfare provision in
2000 under the Red-Green government, and the cuts that followed thereafter under the
same government. In sum, by including the currently unemployed and those not in the
labor force in the definition of outsiders, we see both an increase in the proportion of
outsiders in Germany over time, as well as a consistently positive e↵ect of the German
welfare state, albeit to di↵erent degrees across the years, on narrowing the income gap
between insiders and outsiders.
Finally, Figure 4.5 shows the labor market composition of the five di↵erent socio-
economic groups in Germany from 1984-2004. As expected, we see a stark decrease in
the proportion of blue-collar workers over time, and a marked increase in capital accu-
mulators (inherent insiders), socio-cultural professionals, and low-service functionaries.
The data reflect the changing nature of the German economy and labor market: fewer
industrial workers coexist alongside a rise in the number of working women and those
employed in the service sector.
4.5 Conclusion
The findings presented here emphasize the need for a consistent definition of labor
market insiders and outsiders in social policy and welfare state research. One opera-
tionalization, drawing on employment biography profiles and occupational class groups,
reveals no increase in outsiders over time in Germany. However, changing the opera-
tionalization of outsiders by including the currently unemployed and those not in the
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labor force yields a di↵erent result. Using this definition, we observe a steady increase
in outsiders in Germany through time, which corresponds to expectations derived from
received wisdom in the field. Furthermore, in using this operationalization, the wel-
fare state is shown to have an ameliorative e↵ect on the income gap between insiders
and outsiders at the household level. Taxes and transfers reduce the di↵erence in in-
comes between these two groups in Germany over time, providing preliminary evidence
that welfare state reforms and state restructuring between 1984-2004, while trimming
benefits and payout periods, did not result in an overall loss of welfare (measured in
monetary terms) for those considered to be at a disadvantage in the labor market.
This paper’s analyses suggest several important avenues for future research. Di↵er-
entiating between countries within similar welfare regimes remains an important task.
Whether the conservative continental European welfare states uniformly benefit insiders
and outsiders is doubtful. Furthermore, the Liberal and Nordic welfare regimes have
unique challenges that will a↵ect their ability to shelter outsiders from welfare loss.
How these regimes contrast with the Bismarckian model is an important question.
There is much we do not yet know about the mechanism by which labor market
segmentation translates into social dualism and polarization. This has strong implica-
tions for public policy formulation: further research must consider di↵erential access to
training, promotion, and opportunity for advancement. Income is but one dimension
of labor market dualism; other aspects of workplace stratification—ability to combine
work and family life; upward mobility; employment that is commensurate with edu-
cation, etc.—provide fruitful grounds for further research. The political implications
of labor market segmentation are also highly relevant: profiles of voters who vote for
extreme parties increasingly reflect frustrations with limited labor market opportunity.
Further analyses of the welfare state and labor market in Germany will need to incor-
porate new waves of data in order to get a more accurate picture of the e↵ect of welfare
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reforms since 2004, including Hartz IV. Finally, the di↵erent socio-economic groups
utilized as a basis for outsiderness in this paper reflect the evolution of the German
labor market and education system. Future research will need to identify the profiles of
labor market winners and losers that correspond to a changing economy, and consider
the implications of such divisions not least for gender and social equality.
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Figure 4.5: Socio-Economic Groups as % of Labor Market in Germany Over Time
Source: LIS.
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Classification of Occupations into Post-Industrial Class Groups
Sources: Oesch 2006; Kitschelt and Rehm 2005: 23.  Reproduced from Häusermann and 
Schwander 2011. 
Independent work logic Technical work logic Organizational work logic 
Interpersonal work 
logic 
Technical experts 
(CA)  
21 Physical, 
mathematical and 
engineering science 
professionals 
Higher-grade 
managers (CA)                         
11 Legislators and 
Senior officials  
12 Corporate 
Managers 
Professional/  
managerial Large employers, self-
employed 
professionals and 
petty bourgeoisie with 
employees (CA)                      
Self-employed <=24 Technicians (MSF)                             
31 Physical and 
engineering science 
associate professionals 
Associate managers 
(CA)
13 General Managers 
Socio-cultural semi-
professionals (SCP)      
22 Life science and 
health professionals      
23 Teaching 
professionals        
24 Other professionals  
32 Life science and 
health associate 
professionals        
33 teaching associate 
professionals        
34 Other associate 
professionals 
Associate 
professional / 
managerial 
Petty bourgeoisie 
without employees 
(MSF)
Self-employed >24 
Skilled crafts (BC)                  
71 Extraction and 
building trades 
workers        
72 Metal, machinery 
and related trades 
workers        
73 Precision, 
handicraft, printing 
and related trades 
workers        
74 Other craft and 
related trades workers 
Generally / 
vocationally 
skilled 
Routine operatives 
and routine 
agriculture (BC)                  
61 Market-oriented 
skilled agricultural 
and fishery workers       
92 Agricultural, 
fishery and related 
laborers
81 Stationary-plant 
and related operators     
82 Machine operators 
and assemblers        
83 Drivers and 
mobile-plant operators  
93 Laborers in mining, 
construction, 
manufacturing and 
transport 
Skilled office workers 
and routine office 
workers (MSF)                       
41 Office Clerks        
42 Customer Service 
Clerks 
Skilled service and 
routine service (LSF)                     
51 Personal and 
protective services 
workers        
52 Models, 
salespersons and 
demonstrators        
91 Sales and services 
elementary occupations 
Low/ un-skilled 
Two-digit numbers in front of job descriptions are ISCO88-2d codes. 
CA = Capital accumulators. MSF = Mixed service functionaries. LSF = Low service functionaries. 
BC = Blue-collar workers.  
SCP = Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals.
Figure 4.6: Classification of Occupations
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Operationalization
Insiders / Outsiders Outsiders are all individuals who belong to social groups (defined by class, gender, and age) that 
are significantly more exposed to the risks of unemployment or atypical employment in a 
particular welfare regime (Häusermann & Schwander 2011)
Household-level Gross 
Income
“MI”: Market Income before taxes and transfers
Household-level 
Disposable Income
“DPI”: Net household disposable income after taxes and transfers
Income Gap 1 - (ratio of gross (or disposable) income of outsiders to gross (or disposable) income of insiders)
Disposable Income 
Ratio
Ratio of disposable income of outsiders to disposable income of insiders
Gross Income Ratio Ratio of gross income of outsiders to gross income of insiders
Effect of Taxes & 
Transfers
(Difference between gross income gap and disposable income gap) * 100
Figure 4.7: Operationalization
Sources: LIS Waves 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000, 2004; Husermann & Schwander 2011.
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